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INTRODUCTION†

Parents have a “fundamental right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of [their children].”1 However, more than three
million parents are subject to child protection investigations every year in
the United States.2 Approximately 700 to 800 children are removed from
their homes daily, according to the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services.3 Removal of the child from the home is, in many cases,
where the child protection process begins for parents and families and
when the permanency-timeline clock starts ticking.4 Once the court has
jurisdiction over the child, parents must correct the conditions that led to
the out-of-home placement within a specified period. Sometimes parents
† Thank you to Natalie Netzel for her help in finding this topic, her support
through the writing process, and her guidance as I learn to navigate the child protection
system as a parent advocate.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000).
2. Rachel Blustain, Defending the Family: The Need for Legal Representation in
Child-Welfare
Proceedings,
THE
NATION
(Jan.
16,
2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/defending-the-family-the-need-for-legal-representation-inchild-welfare-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/2Q6L-XX67].
3. Paul Chill, Hundreds of U.S. Children Taken from Home, HARTFORD
COURANT (June 25, 2018), http://www.courant.com/opinion/op-ed/hc-op-chill-removingchildren-20180625-story.html [https://perma.cc/JV86-SZES].
4. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & VIVEK S. SANKARAN, REPRESENTING PARENTS IN
CHILD WELFARE CASES, ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAMILY DEFENDERS, 2 (2015)
(explaining that states are encouraged or required to file a petition to terminate parental
rights after a child has been in foster care for a specified amount of time); Ann Ahlstrom,

CHIPS to Permanency Timeline: Required Timing for Permanency Proceedings under
Minnesota Statutes Chapter 260C except CHIPS by-pass Cases and Voluntary
Placements, CHILDREN’S JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Feb. 2015), http://www.mncourts.gov/mnco
urtsgov/media/scao_library/CJI/CHIPS_TO_Permanency_Timeline_Chart_(February_20
15)_(Ahlstrom).pdf [https://perma.cc/8RWD-8NPX] (outlining the required timing for
permanency proceedings in Minnesota).
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have as little as three to six months5—or up to twelve months in
Minnesota6— to correct the conditions before regaining full custody and
control of their children. Parents not only work against the clock in child
protection matters, but they also confront procedural issues throughout
the proceedings that create barriers to the fundamentally fair procedures
to which they are entitled. This is because child protection proceedings
function differently than proceedings in a more traditional legal case.7 For
instance, once a court determines a child needs protection or services, the
court must then oversee the process and efforts of the social services
agency8 as that agency works toward permanency for the child and the
family.9 A number of decisions made between the initial adjudication and
the final permanency order have the potential to affect the outcome of the
case and substantially affect a parent’s rights.10
Other legal scholars have examined various issues within the child
protection system and looked broadly at those problem areas. This note
will explore Minnesota’s procedures throughout child protection
proceedings that cut away at the due process rights of parents. First, this
note will lay the backdrop by exploring the constitutional rights of parents
in the upbringing of their children. Second, this note will cover the
concepts of due process and fundamental fairness as they apply to parents
involved in the child protection system. Third, this note will discuss
various procedural barriers in Minnesota that diminish fundamental
fairness for parents and erode parents’ due process rights. These
procedural barriers include the lack of representation for parents in child
5. GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 2.
6. MINN. STAT. § 260C.505(a) (2016) (“A permanency or termination of parental
rights petition must be filed at or prior to the time the child has been in foster care or in the
care of a noncustodial or nonresident parent for 11 months . . . .”); MINN. STAT. §
260C.507(a) (2016) (“An admit-deny hearing on the permanency or termination of
parental rights petition shall be held not later than 12 months from the child’s placement in
foster care or an order for the child to be in the care of a noncustodial or nonresident
parent.”); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 4.03, subdiv. 2(b) (“[T]he court shall commence
permanent placement determination proceedings to determine the permanent status of the
child not later than twelve (12) months after the child is placed in foster care or in the
home of a noncustodial or nonresident parent.”).
7. Alicia LeVezu, The Illusion of Appellate Review in Dependency Proceedings, 68
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 83, 2 (2017).
8. MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 27a (2017) (“‘Responsible social services
agency’ means the county social services agency that has responsibility for public child
welfare and child protection services and includes the provision of adoption services as an
agent of the commissioner of human services.”).
9. LeVezu, supra note 7, at 2.
10. See infra Parts IV, V.

2019]

NOTE: MINNESOTA CHILD PROTECTION LAW

687

welfare proceedings, issues with the removal of children from their
parents, the inability to appeal certain orders throughout the proceedings,
the lack of repercussions for child welfare agencies when they fail to
perform their statutory obligations, and issues with involuntary termination
and the presumption of palpable unfitness. Fourth, and finally, this note
will explore the tension between the best interests of the child and the
rights of the parents.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A.

Substantive Due Process: Parenting as a Fundamental Right

The right of parents to control the care and upbringing of their
children is a fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution.11 In its
1923 decision Meyer v. Nebraska,12 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
statute forbidding the teaching of any language except English to
schoolchildren was unconstitutional because it interfered with an
individual’s right to “establish a home and bring up children.”13 Then, in
1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,14 the Court found the Oregon
Compulsory Education Act, which required attendance at public schools,
unconstitutional.15 The Court found that “the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.”16 Furthermore,
the Court held that “rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the state.”17
Later, in Troxel v. Granville,18 pursuant to a state statute permitting
any person to petition the court for visitation rights, a state court granted
visitation to the paternal grandparents of two children, despite the
mother’s opposition to the amount of visitation the grandparents
requested.19 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the parents’ determination

11. Vivek S. Sankaran, Moving Beyond Lassiter: The Need for a Federal Statutory
Right to Counsel for Parents in Child Welfare Cases, 44 J. LEGIS. 1 (2017); GUGGENHEIM
& SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 6.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 399.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534.
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 535.
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 57.
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of their child’s best interests must be given weight.20 The Court asserted
that:
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the state to inject
itself into the private realm of the family to further question the
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the
rearing of that parent’s children.21
Thus, Troxel reaffirmed that parents have a fundamental right to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment22 by holding
that the statute “unconstitutionally infringe[d] on that fundamental parental
right.”23 In addition to substantive rights, parents also have procedural
protections when the parent-child relationship is at stake.

B.

Procedural Due Process and Fundamentally Fair Procedures

The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that no
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”24 Due process has not been, nor will it likely ever be,
precisely defined. Rather, “[a]pplying the Due Process Clause is . . . an
uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’
consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant
precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.”25
When considering what process is due, there are three elements that must
be analyzed: (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the government’s interests,
and (3) the risk that the procedures used will lead to an erroneous
decision.26 In the context of the parent-child relationship, due process
analysis begins with the premise that a parent’s right to “the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” is
a significant interest that “warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.”27 This interest must be balanced
against the state’s interest in the welfare of the child.28 Finally, the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the right to parent must be considered in
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981).
Id. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).

Id.
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assessing the procedural protections afforded to the parent.29 It is “not
disputed that state intervention to terminate the relationship between [a
parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the
requisites of the Due Process Clause.”30
In Stanley v. Illinois,31 pursuant to an Illinois law, an unwed father’s
children were declared wards of the state without a finding of unfitness
when the children’s mother died. The Court found that as “a matter of
due process of law,” the father was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a
parent before his children were taken away from him.32 Accordingly,
Stanley stands for the proposition that parents must be afforded due
process in matters where the state seeks to dissolve their fundamental right
to parent. As a component of due process, parents are entitled to
“fundamentally fair procedures.”33

C.

Santosky v. Kramer: Fundamental Fairness

In Santosky v. Kramer,34 the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide
whether a New York law, which required only “a fair preponderance of
the evidence” to support a termination of parental rights, was a rigorous
enough standard in the face of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.35 The Court held that “the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment demands more . . . . Before a state may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due
process requires that the state support its allegations by at least clear and
convincing evidence.”36 The Court explained that:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If
anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than
do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 28.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37).
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 649.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 747–48.
Id. at 747–48.
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When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it
must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.37
Accordingly, under Santosky, parents are entitled to fundamentally
fair proceedings.38 However, notwithstanding the Court’s Santosky holding,
parents are not necessarily entitled to representation.

D. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services: No Right to Counsel
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services39 established that indigent parents do not have a right to
appointed counsel in parental termination proceedings under the
Constitution.40 The Court noted that “a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is
an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection.’”41 Nonetheless, the Court
held that the appointment of counsel in every parental termination
proceeding is not constitutionally required.42 Therefore, individual
legislatures and courts determine whether a parent will receive counsel and
at what point in the proceedings counsel will be appointed.43 This leads to
variation in how and when counsel is appointed to parents across the
states. Some states require the appointment of counsel before the removal
of a child from her parents.44 Other states do not appoint counsel until the
parents’ rights are being terminated.45 But perhaps most troubling of all,
some states allow a termination to be finalized without ever appointing
counsel.46
In Minnesota, a parent receives representation only if the court
determines that “such an appointment is appropriate.”47 The discretionary
nature of Minnesota’s statute, backed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Lassiter, means Minnesota parents may not be appointed
counsel when their constitutional right to the control and custody of their

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 753–54.
Id.
452 U.S. 18 (1981).

Id.
Id. at 27 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
Id.
Sankaran, supra note 11, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 260C.163(3) (2016).
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children is at stake. Recently, there have been efforts to reform and clarify
this law through appellate advocacy.

E.

The Non-Party Parent’s Right to Representation in Minnesota

The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in its 2018 decision In re Welfare
of the Child of A.M.C. and G.J.F.,48 re-established that parents in
Minnesota do not have a federal or state constitutional due process right to
appointed counsel in a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)
case. The court, however, clarified whether a non-party parent in a CHIPS
case is afforded the right to court-appointed counsel.49
Specifically, G.J.F.—the adjudicated father of N.F., who was
adjudicated a child in need of protection or services—attended the
admit/deny hearing in the CHIPS case and requested court-appointed
counsel.50 At that time, the district court denied the father’s request
because he was not a custodial parent and was not a party to the
proceedings.51 The district court also denied the father’s request to
become a party to the proceedings.52 The father did not receive court-appointed counsel until the county filed a petition seeking termination of
parental rights of both parents in August 2017.53 The father received courtappointed counsel for the termination proceedings and his parental rights
were subsequently terminated.54 On appeal, the court considered whether
the father was entitled to reversal of the termination of his parental rights
because of the district court’s failure to appoint counsel for him in the
CHIPS case.55
The court of appeals held that the district court erred when it “based
its denial of appointed counsel for the father on the fact that the father was
not a party to the CHIPS case.”56 The court reasoned that section
260C.163, subdivisions 3(a)–(g) of the Minnesota Statutes provide that
“[t]he child, parent, guardian or custodian has the right to effective
assistance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court as
provided in this subdivision.”57 Under Chapter 260C, a parent is defined
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

920 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 653.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 659.
Id. (emphasis added).
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as “a person who has a legal parent and child relationship with a child
which confers or imposes on the person legal rights, privileges, duties, and
obligations.”58 In this case, because he was the adjudicated father of N.F.,
the father was legally recognized as the child’s parent under Minnesota
law.59
Because the district court denied the father’s request for appointed
counsel given his nonparty status, the court of appeals explained that the
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure distinguished between
parties and participants.60 Specifically, the court noted that under the rules,
a noncustodial parent, such as a father, is a participant unless the parent
successfully intervenes under Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection
Procedure 23.61 However, the court explained that section 260C.163 of the
Minnesota Statutes and Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure
25 make no distinction between parents who are parties and parents who
are participants regarding the appointment of counsel.62 Instead, the statute
allows the district court to appoint counsel to an indigent parent when the
court “feels that such an appointment is appropriate.”63 Under this
reasoning, the court concluded that the father, as an adjudicated parent of
N.F., should not have been denied court-appointed counsel simply
because he was a participant rather than a party to the proceedings.64
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the district court abused its
discretion because it misapplied the law.65 The court, however, did not
ultimately reverse the termination of the father’s parental rights, noting
that:
[T]he district court could have declined to appoint counsel for
father in the CHIPS case had it felt, as it seems it may have felt,
that appointment of counsel would be inappropriate for a parent
who is repeatedly incarcerated, unavailable to care for the child,
and marginally interested in working a case plan.66
Despite the fact that the court did not reverse the father’s termination
of parental rights, the court did clarify that all parents, regardless of their
party status, are entitled to representation where the court finds that

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 25 (2016)).
Id.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 659 (citing MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 3(c) (2016)).
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id. at 660–61.
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representation is appropriate.67 While the court afforded parents slightly
greater protection regarding appointment to counsel, it nonetheless did
not alter the discretionary nature of Minnesota’s appointment-of-counsel
statute. Consequently, under Minnesota law, parents may still not be
afforded counsel when their parental rights are at stake.
Parents must contend with several other procedural barriers beyond
the possible lack of representation that threaten the fundamentally fair
procedures to which they are entitled.
III. REMOVAL UNDER MINNESOTA LAW
“Perhaps the most important court decision made at the outset of a
child protection case is whether to remove a child from his or her home
or whether to approve a removal if one has been made extrajudicially.”68
Under Minnesota law, child protective services (CPS) can remove a child
from their home before going to court under certain circumstances.69 The
circumstances under which a child can be removed from her parents
without judicial approval depend on the statutory language governing CPS’
operation. The issue is whether the statutory language that permits CPS to
remove a child without judicial approval is specific or open-ended-.70
In contrast to state statutes that require “immediate danger”71 to the
child to justify removal without a court order, Minnesota’s removal statute
broadly states that a child can be taken into custody without a court order
“when [the] child is found in surroundings or conditions which endanger
the child’s health or welfare or which such peace officer reasonably
believes will endanger the child’s health or welfare.”72 This broad language
may be partially why Minnesota removes children from their homes at the
sixth highest rate in the country.73 Beyond the fact that studies have shown

67. Id.
68. GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 33.
69. Id. at 34.
70. See id.
71. See id. (discussing state statutes that require the risk of “imminent” or
“immediate” harm to child to justify removal without a court order).
72. MINN. STAT. § 260C.175, subdiv. 1(2)(ii) (2016) (emphasis added). See also
GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34 (“In many states, however, statutes that
authorize police officers and child protective caseworkers to take children into protective
custody without prior judicial approval contain considerably more open-ended language.
For example, Oregon merely requires a caseworker’s conclusion that ‘the child’s condition
or surroundings reasonably appear to be such as to jeopardize the child’s welfare.’”).
73. Richard Wexler, Minnesota’s Approach to Child Protection Makes Children
Less Safe, MINNPOST (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.minnpost.com/community-
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that children who are left in their homes fare better than those children
placed in foster care74—which is reason enough to reconsider the statutory
language—there may be constitutional due process issues for parents when
their children are removed from their care without a court order.75

A.

Case Study: Whisman v. Rinehart

The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Whisman v. Rinehart76 illustrates the constitutional issues at stake.77 Joel
Whisman, the sixteen-month---old son of Michelle Whisman, was
removed from his mother’s care and placed in a shelter because she had
not picked him up from the babysitter at the agreed-upon time, alongside
reports from Michelle’s boyfriend that she was “passed out drunk” at
home.78 Joel was placed in a shelter despite that the babysitter had
arranged for his grandmother to pick him up.79 There was no courtordered hold until thirteen days after Joel was taken into custody, and
Michelle was not afforded a due-process hearing until Joel had been in
custody for seventeen days.80 Moreover, the social services agency failed to
investigate whether it was necessary to take Joel in the absence of physical
neglect indicators, no immediate threat to his well-being, and no indication
that Michelle was involved in any criminal activity.81
Michelle Whisman brought suit against the juvenile officers and
social workers, claiming that they violated her constitutional right to
familial association and denied her the right to the due process of law.82
The court held that Michelle had an established right to the custody of
Joel, that Joel had a corresponding right to familial association with his
mother, and that the defendants violated these rights.83 The court further
held that even if the defendants had the right to take custody of Joel, they
were required to afford Michelle and Joel a post-deprivation hearing.84
voices/2018/04/minnesotas-approach-child-protection-makes-children-less-safe/
[https://perma.cc/F6ZB-B23Z].
74. Id.
75. See GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34–36.
76. See id. at 36 (“[A] parent’s remedy for a constitutionally illegal seizure of one’s
child is limited to a damages action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2014).”).
77. 119 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997).
78. Id. at 1307.
79. Id. at 1310.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1307.
83. Id. at 1310.
84. Id.
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This case not only illustrates the dangers associated with a lack of oversight
of the decisions made by juvenile officers and social workers but also
demonstrates the ease with which parents’ rights may be violated.

B.

K.D. v. County of Crow Wing and Minnesota’s Removal Statute

In contrast to the Whisman example, the court in K.D. v. County of
Crow Wing found that a mother’s constitutional rights were not infringed
when her seven-year-old son was placed under a seventy-two-hour
protective hold.85 The police had previously investigated the mother after
reports that she was involved in narcotics trafficking.86 When the mother
went to the law enforcement center with her son to retrieve her vehicle
after the police had seized it, her son was placed in a protective hold.87 The
officers later testified that they believed the mother had been under the
influence of drugs when she reported to the law enforcement center;
however, neither of the incident reports prepared by the officers indicated
their belief that she was under the influence at the time of the child’s
removal.88 The mother alleged violations of the Due Process Clause and
violations of the Fourth Amendment.89
In its analysis, the court examined section 260C.175 of the Minnesota
Statutes and concluded that the defendants did not violate the mother’s
constitutional rights when they temporarily removed the child pursuant to
the statute because, based on the circumstances, the removal was proper.90
The court explained that:
The circumstances under which a child can be removed from
his or her parents’ custody without a court order are extremely
limited . . . . Minnesota Statutes § 260C.175 . . . provides that a
child may be taken into immediate custody by a peace officer
“when a child is found in surroundings or conditions which
endanger the child’s health or welfare or which such peace
officer reasonably believes will endanger the child’s health or
welfare.”91
The court’s assertion that the statute provides extremely limited
circumstances under which a child can be removed without a court order
is flawed. Under the statute, a police officer may remove a child as long as
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

434 F.3d 1051, 1058 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1054.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Id. (emphasis added).
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he merely “reasonably believes” that the child’s health or welfare is
threatened.92
Furthermore, Minnesota law does not contemplate removal only
where there is the risk of immediate or imminent harm as other states’
statutes do.93 The Minnesota statute’s subjective nature leaves the door
open to situations in which a child may be removed without judicial
approval. The court’s view that this statutory language limits the
circumstances under which a child may be removed implies that courts are
likely to approve a majority of non-court-ordered removals in Minnesota.
This is because—under the court’s interpretation—removals not ordered by
a court are understood to be the exception rather than the rule.

C.

A Comparison with Other States’ Removal Statutes

This flawed interpretation is especially apparent when contrasted with
other state statutes that limit the circumstances under which a child may be
removed without judicial approval.94 For instance, in Arizona, “exigent
circumstances” must exist to place a child into protective custody without a
court order.95 Under Arizona’s statute, “exigent circumstances” means:
[T]here is probable cause to believe that the child is likely to
suffer serious harm in the time it would take to obtain a court
order for removal and either of the following is true: 1. There is
no less intrusive alternative to taking temporary custody of the
child that would reasonably and sufficiently protect the child’s
health or safety. 2. Probable cause exists to believe that the child
is a victim of sexual abuse or abuse involving serious physical
injury that can be diagnosed only by a physician . . . or health
care provider . . . and who has specific training in evaluations of
child abuse.96
The statutes of West Virginia,97 Iowa,98 New Jersey,99 Washington,100
and Missouri all have similar requirements.101 In addition to the
92. MINN. STAT. § 260C.127 (2016).
93. See id.; see also GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34.
94. See GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34.
95. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-821 (2018).
96. Id.
97. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-303 (West 2019) (“a child protective service worker
may take the child or children into his or her custody (also known as removing the child)
without a court order when: (1) In the presence of a child protective service worker a child
or children are in an emergency situation which constitutes an imminent danger . . . (2)
The worker has probable cause to believe that the child or children will suffer additional
child abuse or neglect or will be removed from the county before a petition can be filed
and temporary custody can be ordered.”).
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requirements of “no time to obtain a temporary order” and “immediate
danger” to the child, Texas’ removal statute requires that any information
furnished by another be “corroborated by personal knowledge of facts.”102
Even in states where there is no time limitation requirement for action in
the absence of a court order, other statutes still restrict instances where a
child may be removed from the home. For example, Colorado’s statute
provides that a child may be taken into temporary custody without a court
order where “[a]n emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered . . .
whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and
there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the
child from the child’s home.”103
Thus, while the Eighth Circuit asserted Minnesota’s statute only
allows children to be removed without a court order in “extremely limited”
circumstances, closer scrutiny shows this is not the case. Accordingly, the
subjective and open-ended nature of Minnesota’s statute, along with the
98. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.79 (West 2019) (“A peace officer or juvenile court
officer may take a child into custody, a physician treating a child may keep the child in
custody, or a juvenile court officer may authorize a peace officer, physician, or medical
security personnel to take a child into custody, without a court order as required under
section 232.78 and without the consent of a parent, guardian, or custodian provided that
both of the following apply: a. The child is in a circumstance or condition that presents an
imminent danger to the child’s life or health. b) There is not enough time to apply for an
order under section 232.78.”).
99. N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:6-8.29 (West 2019) (“A police officer or designated employee
. . . may remove a child from the place where the child is residing, or any person or any
physician treating a child may keep a child in the person’s or physician’s custody without an
order . . . and without the consent of the parent or guardian . . . if the child is in such
condition that the child’s continuance in the place or residence or in the care and custody
of the parent or guardian presents an imminent danger to the child’s life, safety, or health,
and there is insufficient time to apply for a court order . . . .”).
100. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (West 2018) (“A law enforcement officer
may take, or cause to be taken, a child into custody without a court order if there is
probable cause to believe that the child is abused or neglected and that the child would be
injured or could not be taken into custody if it were necessary to first obtain a court order .
. . .”).
101. MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.125 (West 2018) (“A police officer, law enforcement
official, or a physician who has reasonable cause to believe that a child is in imminent
danger of suffering serious physical harm or a threat to life as a result of abuse or neglect
and such person has reasonable cause to believe the harm or threat to life may occur
before a juvenile court could issue a temporary protective custody order . . . the police
officer, law enforcement official or physician may take or retain temporary protective
custody of the child without the consent of the child’s parents, guardian or others legally
responsible for his care.”); GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 4, at 34.
102. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 262.104 (West 2017).
103. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-401 (West 2018).
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court’s interpretation that the statute only allows for limited removals,
places Minnesota parents at a greater risk of having their children
wrongfully removed from their care, in violation of their substantive and
procedural due process rights.
IV. ISSUES THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS
Child protection cases begin and end with the typical due process
procedures that attorneys understand and expect.104 These cases begin
when the government formally charges a parent with abuse or neglect of a
child.105 The government then has the burden of proving that the
individual charged is an unfit parent, which results in the custody of the
child being transferred to the governmental agency.106 Similarly, at the end
of the proceedings, there is typically a permanency trial, where the state
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has not
corrected the conditions that initially led to the transfer of custody to the
governmental agency.107 However, some of Minnesota’s statutes and rules
that guide practices between these two bookends may not be
fundamentally fair and may undermine a parent’s due process rights.108

A.

Out-of-Home Placement Plans

State laws require that the responsible social services agency make
reasonable efforts to provide services to the family to remedy the issues

104. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect
Cases between Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 14–15 (2010).
105. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 260C.141, subdiv. 1 (2016) (stating that any “reputable
person” having knowledge that a child is in need of protection or services may petition the
juvenile court, and outlining the information a petition must contain, including, but not
limited to, a statement of facts that would establish there is a need for protection or
services).
106. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 15–16; see MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, sudiv. 1(a)
(2016) (“To be proved at trial, allegations of a petition alleging a child to be in need of
protection or services must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”).
107. Id. at 16; see generally MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 1(a) (2016) (“To be
proved at trial, allegations of a petition alleging a child to be in need of protection or
services must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301,
subdiv. 1(5) (2016) (stating that the juvenile court may terminate all rights of a parent to a
child if it finds that “following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts,
under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
placement.”).
108. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 14.
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that led to the out-of-home placement.109 To receive federal funds for
foster care,110 the state must provide a written case plan for each child.111
Moreover, under federal law,112 the case plan must specify:
A plan for ensuring that the child receives safe and proper care
and that appropriate services are provided to the parents, child,
and foster parents: [t]o improve the conditions in the parents’
home[,] [t]o facilitate the child’s return to his or her own safe
home or the alternative permanent placement of the child[.]113
States typically require that the case plan include goals and objectives
that the parent must meet to create a safe home for the child, along with
timelines in which to complete the goals and objectives.114 The agency
must file the out-of-home placement plan with the court once the child has
been removed from her home.115
Under the Minnesota Statutes, “[a]n out-of-home placement plan . . .
shall be filed with the court within 30 days of the filing of a juvenile
protection petition . . . when the court orders emergency removal of the
child under this section.”116 Additionally, the out-of-home-placement plan
is to be “developed jointly with the parent and in consultation with
others.”117 While these statutes contemplate a timeline and procedures
(developing the plan jointly with the parent) for the agency to complete the

109. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PRESERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES
AND
ACHIEVE
PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/reunify.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4DH8-E5CT]; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 18.
110. Raymond C. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1029, 1041 (2013) (citing Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act §
471(a)(16)).
111. Id.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (2018).
113. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CASE PLANNING FOR FAMILIES INVOLVED WITH CHILD
WELFARE AGENCIES, 1, 3 (2018), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/caseplanning.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FE7-5272].
114. Id.
115. See generally id. at 2 (“States . . . require a case plan when a child welfare agency
places a child in out-of-home care, including foster care, placement with a relative, group
homes, and residential placement.”).
116. MINN. STAT. § 260C.178, subdiv. 7(a) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 260C.212, subdiv.
1(a) (2016); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 37.02, subdiv. 2.
117. MINN. STAT. § 260C.178, subdiv. 7(b) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 260C.212, subdiv.
1(b) (2016).
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out-of-home placement plan, they do not contemplate repercussions for
the agency in the event of noncompliance.118
Moreover, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, while examining whether
a court’s failure to issue a termination-of-parental-rights order within the
required fifteen days under Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection
Procedure 39.05 and 10.01, found that the court’s failure to comply with
the rules did not warrant a reversal or remand as the mother had argued.119
The court of appeals asserted that Minnesota case law distinguishes
between mandatory and directory provisions, and that where a statute
contains a requirement, but provides no consequence for noncompliance,
the statute is directory rather than mandatory.120 Finally, the court of
appeals found that noncompliance with a directory provision does not
trigger an automatic penalty.121 In this way, the court of appeals found that
the district court’s noncompliance with the rules did not warrant a reversal
because rules 10.01 and 39.05 do not provide a consequence for
noncompliance. Since section 260C. 212, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota
Statutes does not contemplate a consequence for noncompliance, courts
are likely to consider the thirty-day timeline a directory provision, which
means noncompliance would not trigger an automatic penalty.
Accordingly, even though the agency’s failure undoubtedly affects the
parents who are required to comply with the case plan in a timely manner
if they wish to regain custody of their children, the agency will suffer no
repercussions for failing to comply with the thirty-day timeline in the
statute.122
Not only must parents comply with the case plan if they wish to
regain custody of their children, but they must make adequate progress on
the case plan throughout the proceedings. For instance, in Minnesota, the
118. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.212 (2016) (outlining the requirements for the case
plan).
119. In re Welfare of Children of S.L.K.-S., A17-1570, 2018 WL 1787969, at *4
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2018).
120. Id. (citing Johnson v. Cook County, 786 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. 2010) and
Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Minn. 2007)).
121. Id. (citing Johnson, 786 N.W.2d at 295–96).
122. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(5)(iii) (2016) (“[C]onditions leading to
the out-of-home placement have not been corrected. It is presumed that conditions leading
to a child’s out-of-home placement have not been corrected upon a showing that the parent
or parents have not substantially complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case
plan[.]”); MINN. STAT. § 260C.517 (outlining the required findings for a disposition order,
including “the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to use services to correct the
conditions which led to the out-of-home placement; and that the conditions which led to
the out-of-home placement have not been corrected so that the child can safely return
home.”).
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court must conduct a permanency-progress-review hearing six months
after the case begins.123 At this hearing, the court must review the progress
of the case and, specifically, “the parent’s progress on the case plan or outof-home placement plan, whichever is applicable.”124 If the court finds that
the parent has maintained contact with the child and is complying with the
court-ordered case plan, then the court may return the child home or
continue the matter for up to another six months.125 However, if the court
determines that the parent is not complying with the case plan, presumably
measured by the parent’s progress,126 then the court may order the agency
to develop a plan for a legally permanent placement away from the parent
and file a permanency petition within thirty days.127 Accordingly, if the
agency fails to file the case plan within the statutorily mandated thirty days,
the parent is the only party who suffers the consequences at the six-month
mark after failing to make progress. Moreover, the failure of the agency to
file a case plan promptly also can affect the outcome of the case, as the
parent is nevertheless held to the permanency timelines and must still
correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement prior to the
twelve month permanency deadline.128 Consequently, a late start on the
case plan at the beginning of a case could mean termination of parental
rights at the end.

B.

Reasonable Efforts to Hold the Agency Accountable?

As noted, under federal law, state agencies are required to make
“reasonable efforts” to rehabilitate parents who have had their children
removed and ultimately reunify the family.129 What reasonable efforts
entail, however, is not clearly defined in federal law.130 In Minnesota, what

123. MINN. STAT. § 260C.204 (2016).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. (“(a) When a child continues in placement out of the home of the parent
or guardian from whom the child was removed, no later than six months after the child’s
placement the court shall conduct a permanency progress hearing to review: (1) the
progress of the case, the parent’s progress on the case plan or out-of-home placement plan,
whichever is applicable[.]”).
127. Id.
128. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(5)(i) (2016).
129. O’Brien, supra note 110, at 1030.
130. See id. at 1054 (stating that “[t]here is lack of a concise definition in federal statute
or judicial opinions . . . .”); Amelia S. Watson, A New Focus on Reasonable Efforts to
Reunify,
A.B.A.
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_la
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constitutes reasonable efforts is a factual inquiry that requires the court to
consider several factors.131 Specifically, the “court shall consider whether
services to the child . . . were: (1) relevant to the safety and protection of
the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3)
culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.”132 Regardless of how
“reasonable efforts” are defined, the requirement seems intended to hold
the agency accountable for its efforts to reunify the family, in light of the
parents’ fundamental right to the care and custody of their child under the
Fourteenth Amendment.133 Accordingly, the reasonable efforts
requirement functions as a check on the agency. However, in practice, this
requirement may not fulfill its apparent purpose.134
Presumably, the parent may argue that the agency has failed to make
“reasonable efforts” to create the case plan promptly when the agency
does not meet the deadline outlined in the statute. However, even where
the agency fails to make reasonable efforts to submit a timely case plan,
judges are reluctant to find that no reasonable efforts were made because
the state may lose federal aid.135 Consequently, even when agencies fail to
make the required reasonable efforts, they do not suffer repercussions.
Instead, parents who receive case plans more than thirty days into the case
are the ones left with less time to remedy the conditions that led to the
removal of their children.
w_practice/vol_31/september_2012/a_new_focus_on_reasonableeffortstoreunify.html
[https://perma.cc/NXK6-3GWE].
131. See MINN. STAT. § 260.012(h)(1)–(6) (2016).
132. Id.
133. O’Brien, supra note 110, at 1030.
134. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 27 (“It is not surprising, therefore, that state
courts’ implementation of federal ‘reasonable efforts’ requirements has faced criticism as
substance-free rubber stamp decisions by state judges . . . . In the absence of a federal
definition of the term or adequate federal funding for prevention or reunification services,
‘judicial findings of reasonable efforts are often made by judges by rote.’”).
135. See generally Priscilla Martens, Reasonable Efforts Revived, INTENSIVE FAM.
PRES. SERVS., (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.intensivefamilypreservation.org/reasonable-effortsrevived/ [https://perma.cc/6V5B-V5LB] (“In a revealing survey conducted in Michigan in
2005, 20% of judges reported they always found reasonable efforts had been made, 70%
said they rarely concluded there were no reasonable efforts, and 40% admitted that they
lied about reasonable efforts being made because the state would otherwise lose federal
aid! A nationwide survey of over 1,200 juvenile court judges found that only 44 judges had
ever made at least one no reasonable efforts finding.”); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 106, at 27
(“One study of 463 New York City cases involving children who had been in foster care for
at least two years, and thus lacked legal permanency for a significant period of time,
revealed that judges found that the government had made reasonable efforts to reach
permanency in 457 cases.”).
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Social Services Agency Court Reports

Similarly, under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection
Procedure,136 the responsible social services agency “shall submit periodic
certified reports to the court regarding the child and family.”137 These
reports must be filed with the court and served upon all parties at least five
days before the hearing at which the report will be considered.138
Additionally, the report may be supplemented at or before the hearing,
orally or in writing.139 This rule implicates two issues that affect
fundamental fairness for parents. First, the content of these reports is
critical to the court’s decisions, even if the reliability of the report may be
questionable. Second, this rule specifies that all reports be filed with the
court and served upon the parties at least five business days before the
hearing. Similar to the issue regarding the timeline for the filing of the outof-home placement plan discussed previously,140 there are seemingly no
repercussions contemplated in the rule for when the agency fails to file the
report by the given deadline.

1.

Content of Reports

Agency reports must contain not only demographic information
pertinent to the case but also must “identify progress made on the out-ofhome placement plan or case plan; . . . address the safety, permanency,
and well-being of the child . . . ; and . . . request orders related to . . . the
child’s need for protection or services.”141 Thus, these reports offer critical
information on which the court relies. As such, it is important to take a
closer look at the sources of this information and their reliability.
The rule states that “[e]ach report shall include a statement certifying
the content as true based upon personal observation, first-hand
knowledge, or information and belief.”142 While each report must include
a statement of veracity, the reports must be based merely on “personal
observation, first-hand knowledge, or information and belief.”143
Consequently, these reports are nothing more than the subjective
observations and beliefs of agency workers who need to do nothing more
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 38.
MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 38.01, subdiv. 1.
Id. at subdiv. 2.
Id. at subdiv. 3.
See supra Section IV.A.
Id. at subdiv. 5.

Id.
Id.
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than believe the truth of their statements. This information is then
communicated to the court. The court, in turn, relies on this information
in making significant decisions about the lives of children and families, as
well as the trajectory of the case.144 Additionally, parents may not be
afforded the opportunity to rebut this information when the reports are
filed late.

2.

A Parent’s Right to Rebuttal

While Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure 38
explicitly states that the agency shall file and serve the report at least five
business days before the hearing, the rule itself does not include any
language regarding the consequences for a failure to submit the reports
within the designated time.145 Thus, similar to the timing requirement
pertaining to case plans, the timing requirement for reports is likely a
directory provision rather than mandatory. Accordingly, noncompliance
would not trigger a consequence for the agency.146 However, lack of
compliance with the timing requirement by the agency affects a parent’s
right to be heard.

3.

A Parent’s Right to Be Heard

One firmly established element of procedural due process is the
opportunity to be heard.147 Minnesota law confers on parents the right to
participate148 and be heard in the proceedings: “A parent with a legally
recognized parent and child relationship must be provided the right to be
heard in any review or hearing held with respect to the child, which
includes the right to be heard on the disposition order . . . ,149 parental
visitation . . . ,150 and the out-of-home placement plan.”151 While section

144. See generally Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 22–25, 28 (including Minnesota in
a list of states that do not provide statutory guidance regarding whether courts should
receive contested evidence at hearings).
145. Id.
146. See infra Section IV.A.
147. United States Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (“Due
process requires notice ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.’”).
148. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 2(b) (2016).
149. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 260C.201, subdiv. 1 (2016).
150. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 2(b) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 260C.178 (2016).
151. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 2(b) (2016) (referring to MINN. STAT. §
260C.212, subdiv. 1).
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260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes ostensibly allows parents to participate
in all proceedings, including “any review or hearing held with respect to
the child,”152 when the agency fails to submit its reports on time, the
parents’ opportunity to be heard is eroded.
The timing requirement in this rule was presumably included to
allow parents or their counsel to effectively prepare for the hearing by
reviewing the report, identifying any inaccuracies, and taking the necessary
steps to correct or counter those inaccuracies. Under Minnesota Rules of
Juvenile Protection Procedure 38.10, “[a] party may object to the content
or recommendations of the responsible social services agency’s report by
submitting a written objection either before or at the hearing at which the
report is to be considered . . . . Objections . . . may also be stated on the
record.”153 But when the agency fails to file the report within five business
days of the hearing at which it will be considered, parents and counsel are
left with little to prepare for the hearing and ensure that parents have a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Preparation is important because, at these hearings, the court reviews
“whether foster care is necessary and continues to be appropriate or
whether the child should be returned to the home of the parent or legal
custodian from whom the child was removed.”154 Additionally, the court
must determine, among other things, whether the agency is making
reasonable efforts, the parents’ progress toward case plan goals, and
whether the parent is visiting the child.155 These are all significant decisions
that can affect the case and later permanency decisions. Furthermore, as
explained in more detail below,156 orders from review hearings or
intermediate-disposition hearings are not appealable since they are not
“final” orders of the court.157 Accordingly, when parents or their attorneys
are not provided with reports promptly before the hearing, the agency
suffers no repercussions, but the parents likely will.158 This is especially
true when parents are unrepresented.

152. Id.
153. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 38.10.
154. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 41.06, subdiv. 2(a).
155. Id.
156. See infra Part V.
157. Felders v. Bairett, 885 F.3d 646, 650 (10th Cir. 2018) (“A ‘final decision’ is
ordinarily one that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment.’”).
158. See generally Gupta-Kagan supra note 104, at 23 (discussing the fact that in New
York, delayed and incomplete agency reports are the biggest cause of delayed permanency
hearings).
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Thus, there are several issues with social services agencies’ court
reports that impact the rights of parents and undoubtedly affect how each
case unfolds. Moreover, the court’s decisions at each review hearing where
a report is considered are not appealable; consequently, these decisions go
unchecked by a higher court.
V. MINIMAL OPPORTUNITY FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
In child welfare cases, the appellate system functions as a safeguard
that ensures that the parent-child relationship is not unfairly terminated. It
forces the parties and the courts to follow statutes, rules, and policies, and
provides an independent check to correct any mistakes.159 Minnesota is
one of many states that require juvenile protection hearings to apply
traditional appellate rules.160 This means that appellate review is limited to
final orders, which does not fit well into the system of juvenile protection
proceedings where most of the court’s orders are not considered “final.”161
Consequently, “many—if not most—of the decisions about the scope and
definition of a child’s legal rights are completely shielded from appellate
review.”162 Not only are a child’s legal rights affected but a parent’s rights
are implicated as well.163

A.

No Appeal as of Right for an Intermediate Disposition Order

The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure state that
“[a]n appeal may be taken by the aggrieved person from a final order of
the juvenile court affecting a substantial right of the aggrieved person,
including but not limited to an order adjudicating a child to be in need of
protection or services, neglected and in foster care.”164 The rule seemingly
contemplates that there are orders beyond an order adjudicating a child in
need of protection or services that may be appealed as of right.

159. VIVEK S. SANKARAN, GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CHILD
WELFARE APPELLATE GUIDE 1 (2013), https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/
Resources/Documents/Publications/CWS/ChildWelfareAppellateGuide.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/TH2W-KH6C].
160. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.01 (“[A]ppeals of juvenile protection matters shall be
in accordance with the Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure.”); LeVezu, supra note 7, at 2.
161. LeVezu, supra note 7, at 6–7; accord Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 29.
162. LeVezu, supra note 7, at 7.
163. Id. at 2.
164. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.02, subdiv. 1.
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Nonetheless, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has determined that
intermediate-disposition-hearing orders are categorically not appealable.165
In In re Welfare of the Child of E.G. and K.G., Sr., Parents,166
appellants E.G. and K.G., Sr. appealed an intermediate dispositional
order in the CHIPS matter concerning their two children.167 Child One
had previously been removed from the home and placed in foster care,
while Child Two was allowed to remain in the home.168 However, the
county later filed an emergency motion to remove Child Two from the
home, and after a hearing on December 1, 2015, the court ordered Child
Two to be placed in foster care.169 At a dispositional review hearing on
December 17, 2015, after the removal of the second child, the court
ordered that both children remain in foster care, that the county
determine whether the children’s grandparents could be foster-care
licensed, and that the parents receive supervised visitation.170 The parents
appealed both orders.171
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that an intermediate
dispositional order in a CHIPS matter is not appealable as a matter of
right.172 The court noted that in juvenile-protection proceedings, the
interim dispositional orders, which grant legal custody to the responsible
social services agency, are subject to district court review every ninety
days.173 In its holding, the court asserted, “The district court’s intermediate
dispositional orders prior to the permanency hearing do not determine a
substantial right of [parents] and, therefore, are not appealable as a matter
of right under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 47.02, subd. 1.”174 Because the orders
did not determine the final placement of the children, the court reasoned
that they were not “final” orders under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile
Protection Procedure175 and therefore, were not appealable as of right.176

165. In re Child of E.G. and K.G., Sr., 876 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 873.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 873–74.
171. Id. at 874.
172. Id. at 874–75.
173. Id. at 874 (citing MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 41.06, subdiv. 1).
174. Id. at 875.
175. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.02, subdiv. 1.
176. In re Child of E.G. and K.G., Sr., 876 N.W.2d at 874; Gupta-Kagan, supra note
104, at 29.
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Reasonable Efforts Go Unchecked

As noted previously, one of the functions of the appellate system is to
ensure that the court and the parties follow statutes, rules, and agency
policies.177 In the case of reasonable efforts, which a court must determine
at each intermediate disposition hearing,178 the court’s finding is nearly
always in favor of the agency179 and goes unchecked by higher courts
throughout the proceedings.180
Of course, the reasonable efforts of the agency may be checked after
the final termination order, as was the case in In re Welfare of the
Children of A.R.B.181 In that case, the district court terminated the father’s
parental rights after finding that he failed to complete a case plan to
correct conditions that led to his son’s out-of-home placement.182 However,
the county never actually developed a case plan for the father to complete,
and the evidence showed that the county never attempted to explore any
reunification services for the father during his period of incarceration.183
On appeal, the father argued that the county failed to provide reasonable
rehabilitative efforts to reunify him with his son.184 Specifically, he argued
that the court must reverse the district court’s order terminating his
parental rights because the county had not prepared a written case plan
that outlined the necessary steps he needed to take to reunite with his
son.185
The court found that section 260C.212 of the Minnesota Statutes was
unambiguous.186 The statute mandates that a case plan be prepared and
that it include all necessary components outlined in the statute, including
reasons for placement of the child in foster care, a description of the
problems or conditions that led to the out-of-home placement, and the
changes the parent must make for the child to safely return home.187
Because the county never provided the father with a written case plan, the
177. See infra Part V.
178. MINN. STAT. § 260C.201, subdiv. 2 (2016) (stating that any order for disposition
must set forth in writing whether reasonable efforts to finalize the permanent plan for the
child were made, including reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent or
guardian).
179. See supra note 136.
180. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 27.
181. 906 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
182. Id. at 896.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 897.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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court reversed the termination of the father’s parental rights and
remanded the case to the district court to allow the county to prepare a
case plan with the father and provide him with an opportunity to complete
it.188
This case illustrates the importance of appellate review in childprotection proceedings, as well as its pivotal role in enforcing the rights of
parents who find themselves in the system. However, this case also
illustrates that reasonable efforts go unchecked until the final order. This
means that children remain in foster care—as D.T.R.’s child did—while
their parents navigate a system that is, at times, indifferent to their rights
and not held accountable for inaction.189 Had the county’s efforts been
checked earlier in the process, the outcome may have been different.
Additionally, as noted previously, one of the goals of the system is to
achieve timely reunification for families.190 When reasonable efforts go
unchecked until the end of the proceedings, parents do not have their
rights enforced, families spend more time in the system, and children
spend more time in foster care. Not only do reasonable efforts by the
agency go unchecked, but emergency removals also go unchecked.

C.

Emergency Protective Care Orders Goes Unchecked

In Minnesota, the court must hold an emergency removal hearing
within seventy-two hours of the time the child was removed from her
parents to determine whether the child should continue in custody.191 At
that hearing, the child may be released to the parents if the court
determines that the child’s health or welfare is not immediately
endangered.192 Alternatively, if the court concludes that the child’s health
or welfare will be immediately endangered in the care of the parent, then
“the court shall order the child into foster care under the legal
responsibility of the responsible social services agency.”193 The court must

188. Id. at 900.
189. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 104, at 27 (“When such decisions cannot be
appealed until the end of a case—when an adoption decree or termination of parental rights
decision is entered—appellate judges face strong incentives to avoid close examination of
reasonable efforts decisions. Overturning a permanency decision based on the lack of
reasonable efforts earlier in the case could ‘upset stability for a child who has been
previously neglected or abused. In such circumstances, courts may find it earlier to rule that
reasonable efforts need only mean meager or pro-forma efforts.’”).
190. See supra Section IV.A.
191. MINN. STAT. § 260C.178, subdiv. 1(a) (2016).
192. Id. at subdiv. 1(b).
193. Id. at subdiv. 1(c).
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issue a written order within three days of the conclusion of the emergency
protective care (EPC) hearing.194
There is no language in the emergency protective care rule or statute
that indicates that an EPC order may be appealed.195 Furthermore, similar
to an intermediate disposition order, the emergency protective order is
reviewable by the court and is, therefore, likely not considered a “final”
appealable order under current Minnesota law.196 For instance, the court
may schedule a formal review hearing concerning continued protective
care at the request of a party or the county attorney.197 At the conclusion of
the review hearing, the court can either return the child home, continue
the child in protective care, or release the child with conditions to assure
the child’s safety.198 Accordingly, because the court has a mechanism for
review by way of motion of any party, and the EPC rule and statute do not
contain language indicating that the order is appealable, an effort to appeal
an EPC order would likely be rejected.199
Notably, while the EPC order may not be considered a “final” order,
it undoubtedly affects “a substantial right” of the parent. An EPC order
effectively, even if only temporarily, ends a parent’s fundamental right to
the “care, custody, and control” of his or her children.200 However, the rule
reads, “An appeal may be taken by the aggrieved person from a final order
of the juvenile court affecting a substantial right of the aggrieved person . . .
.”201 The rule’s implied conjunctive nature does not allow a court to
consider separately whether the order is final or whether it affects a

194. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.10.
195. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.178 (2016); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30; Natalie Netzel,
Educ. and Advocacy Dir., Inst. for Children, Families, and Cmtyss., Mitchell Hamline Sch.
of Law & John R. Rodenberg, Assoc. Judge at the Minn. Court of Appeals, Presentation at
the Mitchell Hamline Sch. of Law Child Protection Symposium: Planning for Change in
Minn.: How to Improve Our Removal Process (Oct. 13, 2017).
196. See MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.02, subdiv. 1; accord In re Child of E.G. and
K.G., Sr., 876 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016); In re Welfare of Child of B.G.
and B.C., A16-1512, 2017 WL 958476, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.13, 2017) (“In this
case, the EPC order was not an appealable final order affecting substantial rights.”) (citing
In re Welfare of E.G., 876 N.W.2d at 873–74); In re Welfare of E.G., 876 N.W.2d at
874.
197. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.11, subdiv. 3(a)–(b).
198. Id. at subdiv. 3(d)(1)–(2).
199. Netzel et al., supra note 195; In re Welfare of Child of B.G. and B.C., 2017 WL
958476, at *4.
200. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000).
201. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 47.02, subdiv. 1.
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substantial right of the parent. Instead, an order is only appealable where it
is final and affects a substantial right of a parent.202
As noted previously,203 this is significant within the context of this
rule’s application and because of the unique nature of child-protection
proceedings.204 The ongoing nature of the proceedings means that
substantial rights of parents are repeatedly reviewed, and decisions
regarding these substantial rights are made each step of the way.205 The lack
of appellate review of these decisions means that many, if not all of them,
will go unchecked by a higher court.206

D. Other Issues with the Emergency Protective Care Process
Besides the fact that emergency protective care determinations likely
are not appealable, there are other issues with the EPC process that must
be addressed. For example, the court must advise all parties and
participants of their rights at the EPC hearing.207 Specifically, the court
must advise the parties of their right “to present evidence and to crossexamine witnesses regarding whether the child should return home with or
without conditions or whether the child should be placed in protective
care.”208 This provision seems to afford procedural due process209 to all

202. Id.
203. See supra Part V.
204. See LeVezu, supra note 7, at 2 (“In the realm of state trial courts, child abuse and
neglect (dependency) proceedings are unique. A traditional court case starts with a list of
grievances by one party and ends with a settlement or trial resolving those grievances on the
merits. However, the dependency proceedings that accompany a child’s entry into foster
care are different. Dependency proceedings place courts in the position of not only
determining an ultimate result, but of overseeing the ongoing actions of a state agency . . . .
The grievances in a dependency proceeding are ever-changing as the child grows and her
needs and circumstances change.”).
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id.
207. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.05.
208. Id.
209. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975)
(including in the elements of a fair hearing: an unbiased tribunal, notice of the proposed
action and the grounds asserted for it, an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed
action should not be taken, the right to present evidence (including the right to call
witnesses, the right to know opposing evidence, the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses), a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented, opportunity to be
represented by counsel, requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence
presented, and requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons
for its decision).
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parties, but in practice, only the county attorney is able to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses.
Parents are first advised of their rights “[a]t the beginning of the
emergency protective care hearing.”210 This means that parents may not be
aware that they have the right to present a defense until they walk into the
courtroom. Nor are they given adequate time or means to prepare their
defense before the hearing. In contrast, the county enters the hearing
presumably armed with a report that will act as evidence as to why the
child should remain in protective care. This lack of time for the parent to
meaningfully prepare is coupled with that fact that the parent may not be
represented by counsel.211 While their right to introduce evidence or crossexamine witnesses does not disappear simply because they are
unrepresented, a parent’s likelihood of successfully combating the county’s
allegations through the presentation of their own evidence or through
effective cross-examination is slim without the assistance of counsel.212
Even where counsel is appointed, the lawyer probably will be a public
defender who, given large caseloads, lacks the time to prepare a
meaningful defense to the county’s allegations, as they have likely just been
introduced to the client and the case.
Finally, the court has broad discretion to admit “any evidence . . .
that is relevant to the decision of whether to continue protective care of the
child or return the child home.”213 This includes “reliable hearsay” and
“opinion evidence.”214 While this may allow a parent who is not
represented and not well-versed in the rules of evidence to present a
defense, it also means that a parent’s fundamental right to the care and
control of her child is halted based, at times, only on hearsay and the
opinions of others, rather than facts backed by reliable evidence.215

210. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.05.
211. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 3(a) (2016).
212. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“The right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law . . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he may have a perfect one . . . . He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.”).
213. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 30.06.
214. Id.
215. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just
determination.”).
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VI. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

A.

Involuntary Termination and Presumption of Palpable Unfitness

Under Minnesota law, a parent “is presumed . . . palpably unfit to be
a party to the parent and child relationship upon a showing that the
parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily
terminated or that the parent’s custodial rights to another child have been
involuntarily transferred to a relative.”216 As an initial matter, parents who
invoke their right to a trial in the face of termination or transfer of custody
run the risk of being labeled “palpably unfit.” However, parents who
voluntarily relinquish their right to the control and custody of their child,
without holding the state to its burden of proving unfitness by clear and
convincing evidence, will not be deemed palpably unfit.217 Beyond the fact
that a parent who holds the state to its burden runs the risk of being
classified as palpably unfit, there are other issues with the statutory
presumption.
When a parent’s rights have previously been terminated, the county’s
duty to provide reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the
family is relieved.218 The presumption is seemingly meant to protect the
best interests of children by expediting the termination of parental rights
and quickly establishing permanency for children.219 As noted in In re
Welfare of Child of R.D.L. and J.W., Parents,220 “[t]he statutory
presumption directly serves the compelling government interest of
protecting children because it facilitates the more expeditious resolution of
cases involving children in need of protection. The principle that child
protection cases are to receive priority and be resolved quickly is a
thoroughly engrained policy . . . .”221 Although well intentioned, this
presumption undermines parental rights and due process protections.

216. MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b)(4) (2016).
217. See id.
218. MINN. STAT. § 260.012 (a)(2), (4) (2016); In re P.T. and A.T., 657 N.W.2d 577,
592 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the elimination of the requirements of reasonable
efforts in cases where there has previously been an involuntary termination does not violate
the Minnesota Constitution).
219. Vivek S. Sankaran, Child Welfare’s Scarlet Letter: How A Prior Termination of
Parental Rights can Permanently Brand a Parent as Unfit, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 685, 692 (2017).
220. 853 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 2014) (establishing that the statutory presumption in
Minnesota Statute §260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) does not violate the Equal Protection
Clauses of the Minnesota or United States Constitutions).
221. Id. at 134.
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Vivek Sankaran explains, “[l]awyers challenging the constitutionality
of prior TPR statutes have relied upon Stanley to frame their
arguments.”222 In Stanley v. Illinois,223 under Illinois law, unwed fathers
were presumed incapable of caring for their children.224 When the mother
of Stanley’s children died, his children became state wards without the
state proving that Stanley was unfit to parent.225 The Illinois Supreme
Court ultimately held that as a matter of due process, Stanley was entitled
to a hearing on his fitness before his children we taken from him.226 The
court reasoned:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care,
when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child.227
The court further asserted the state “insists on presuming rather than
proving Stanley’s unfitness solely because it is more convenient to
presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is
insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is
the dismemberment of his family.”228
The presumption under Minnesota law can be distinguished from the
presumption in Stanley v. Illinois. The Minnesota presumption applies to
parents who have previously been proven unfit to parent and had their
parental rights involuntarily terminated,229 rather than simply applying to all
unwed parents, regardless of their fitness as parents.230 However, that does
not eliminate the dangers associated with operating under a presumption.
Specifically, as the Supreme Court noted in Stanley, the presumption
“forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care” and
“needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both
parent and child.”231 Despite the apparent contradiction between the
holding in Stanley v. Illinois and the statutory presumption under
Minnesota law, the presumption remains.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Sankaran, supra note 219, at 696.
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 656–57.
Id. at 658.
MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b)(4) (2016).
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646–47.
Id. at 657.
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Challenging the Presumption in Minnesota

Despite challenges to it, the presumption remains in Minnesota. In

In re Child of P.T. and A.T.,232 appellant-parents challenged the
involuntary termination of their parental rights to their fifth child after their
rights to their other four children had previously been involuntarily
terminated.233 On appeal, appellants argued, among other things, that the
statutory presumption of unfitness found in section 260C.301, subdivision
1(b)(4), of the Minnesota Statutes violated appellants’ procedural and
substantive due process rights under both the United States Constitution
and the Minnesota Constitution.234
In its procedural due process analysis, the court noted that due
process in parental termination proceedings “embodies the notion of
fundamental fairness.”235 The court went on to assert that “[f]undamental
fairness guarantees a parent facing termination proceedings a right to a
meaningful adversarial hearing.”236 Accordingly, the court concluded that
because appellants were afforded an adversarial proceeding, the
presumption in section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) did not deny
procedural due process to parents.237
Similarly, in its substantive due process analysis, the court concluded
that the statutory presumption does not violate parents’ substantive due
process right to raise their children.238 The court reasoned that the state has
a compelling interest in protecting children from abuse by their parents
and that the statute is narrowly tailored to meet the state’s compelling
interest.239 The court asserted that a “parent who has had his or her
parental rights involuntarily terminated has been adjudicated as posing a
threat to the child now and into the future.”240 This view is precisely what
worried the Supreme Court in Stanley: the notion that a parent who has

232. 657 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
233. Id. at 580.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 587 (citing In re Welfare of J.W., 391 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1986)).
236. Id. at 587–88.
237. Id. at 588.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing In re Welfare of S.Z, 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996)); see
generally Sankaran, supra note 219, at 698 (using Minnesota’s case as an example of when
courts “simply state[] that a prior TPR is evidence of a parent’s continuing and permanent
unfitness, an argument that contravenes the system’s recognition that an individual’s guilt
cannot be defined solely based on prior findings.”).
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had her rights terminated poses a threat to children now and in the
future.241
In applying a presumption that a parent is palpably unfit, the court is
determining that because a parent was unfit at one time, she will always be
unfit.242 When courts and child-welfare agencies presume that a parent is
unfit simply because she or he may have been at one time, they ignore the
fact that people grow and change over time.243 This, in turn, suggests a
belief that efforts to rehabilitate are futile.244 This view undermines the
entire child protection system, which is intended to focus on the
rehabilitation of parents and reunification of families.
Thus, a parent who has had his or her rights involuntarily terminated
is classified as unfit, and any future parent-child relationship may be
terminated.245 So, while the parent may be afforded a trial regarding fitness
to parent, it typically occurs after the children have already been removed
from the parent’s care, regardless of whether or not the parent is currently
fit.246 Parents are then tasked with overcoming the statutory presumption
that they are unfit to parent.

2.

Case Study: The Presumption in Kansas247

While Kansas did not invalidate the statutory presumption entirely,
the Kansas Supreme Court did invalidate the presumption as it pertained
to In re Interest of J.L. and D.L.248 The court’s reasoning offers further
insight into the deficiency of a statutory presumption such as the one the
court confronted in the case and the one found in Minnesota.

241. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972); see Sankaran, supra note 219, at
698 (“The reasoning in these cases flatly contradicts Stanley, which barred courts from
relying on irrebuttable presumptions to find a parent to be currently unfit based solely on
past conduct.”).
242. Sankaran, supra note 219, at 699.
243. Id. (citing In re Gach, 889 N.W.2d 707 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016)).
244. Id.
245. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(4).
246. See In re Child of J.A.K. and J.M.S., Parents, 907 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2018).
247. In his article, Child Welfare’s Scarlet Letter: How a Prior Termination of
Parental Rights can Permanently Brand a Parent as Unfit, author Vivek Sankaran briefly
summarizes the court’s findings in In re J.L. as an example of courts that have invalidated
prior TPR statutes. Mr. Sankaran’s article provides a more thorough analysis and highlights
the issues with the statutory presumption found in Minnesota law. See Sankaran, supra
note 219, at 697–98.
248. See In re J.L. and D.L., 20 Kan. App. 2d 665 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
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In In re Interest of J.L. and D.L.,249 a mother had had her parental
rights to two children terminated by court order.250 When the mother had
another child eight years later, the state sought termination of her parental
rights to that child.251 Operating under a Kansas statute that contained a
presumption of unfitness where a parent had a previous termination, the
state simply offered proof of the prior termination as evidence of the
mother’s unfitness.252 The mother was then burdened with rebutting that
presumption.253 Despite the mother’s efforts, the trial court found that she
had failed to rebut the presumption and terminated her parental rights
once again.254
On appeal, the court questioned whether the mother’s procedural
due process rights were violated.255 To answer that question, the court
looked to Mathews v. Eldridge and applied the Mathews test.256 In
analyzing the case, the court first looked at the private interests affected by
the government’s action.257 Here, the private interest was the parent’s right
to the custody and control of her child.258 The court reasoned that “other
than the right to personal freedom, there may be no private right valued
more highly or protected more zealously by the courts than the right of a
parent to the custody and control of his or her children.”259 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the private rights affected were “very significant”
and “entitled to the highest protection.”260
The second factor the court analyzed under the Mathews test was the
risk of error from the procedures employed and the value of different
procedural safeguards.261 The court weighed the risk of error in using the
“uncontrolled presumption of unfitness versus the standard procedure of

249. Id.
250. Id. at 666.
251. Id. at 666–67.
252. Id. (citing K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 38-1585) (“[I]f the state establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that: (1) A parent has previously been found to be an unfit parent in
proceedings . . . (b) The burden of proof is on the parent to rebut the presumption. In the
absence of proof that the parent is presently fit . . . the court shall now terminate the
parent’s parental rights . . . .”).
253. Id. at 667.
254. Id. at 668.
255. Id. at 669.
256. Id.; see supra Section II.B.
257. In re J.L. and D.L., 20 Kan. App. 2d at 671.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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requiring the State to prove that unfitness.”262 The court ultimately
determined that the risk of error in using the presumption (as applied in
this case) was too high.263 The court noted that allowing the state to
terminate a parent’s rights, based on documentation of an eight-year-old
termination, was simply too easy a task for the government and that there
was “no good reason to excuse the government from the task of proving
unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.”264
Perhaps most significant is the court’s comparison between the
resources available to the state and the resources available to the parent.
The court found that the parent is always operating at a disadvantage in
terms of resources and that applying the statutory presumption of unfitness
only magnifies this disadvantage.265 The court concluded, “The net result is
an unacceptable risk that a parent judged unfit many years ago will
erroneously be adjudged unfit today for no other reason than a
presumption based on the result in a case which has become irrelevant.”266
More importantly, the court’s reasoning on this issue cannot be
limited to cases where the prior termination was eight years old. Parents,
regardless of the age of the prior termination, nearly always operate at a
disadvantage in this system. This is especially true when parents must
prove their current fitness while the state merely needs to present evidence
of a prior termination to dissolve the parent-child relationship. On this
issue, the court analogized, stating that:
The State may not deprive a citizen of liberty by doing nothing
more than filing proof of a prior conviction. The State may,
however, terminate parental rights by doing nothing more than
filing proof of a prior termination. Once this is done, parental
rights will be terminated unless the unfortunate parent can
convince the trial court that he or she is no longer unfit . . . that
burden is shifted from the State with all its resources to a parent
who has little, if any, resources in comparison.267
Ultimately, the court determined that to remedy this disadvantage, at
least in this case, the state must be required to prove its case without the
benefit of the presumption.268 This adjustment would not only reduce the
risk of error, but also would readjust resources available to the parties and
ensure that parental rights cannot be terminated without clear and
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.Id.
267.
268.

Id.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id.
at 672–73 (emphasis added).

Id. at 674.
Id.

2019]

NOTE: MINNESOTA CHILD PROTECTION LAW

719

convincing evidence of the parent’s current unfitness.269 Again, while the
court intended to apply this procedure to the case at hand, this remedy
would undoubtedly improve procedural protections for parents in all
subsequent termination cases.
Finally, as to the last Mathews factor, the court found that the state’s
power to protect children would not be hindered by eliminating the
presumption, as it does not place an unreasonable burden on the
government. The court determined that the loss suffered by a parent
“greatly outweighs the government’s interest in a summary adjudication.”270
As noted previously, the court did not find the statute itself
unconstitutional;271 rather, it found the statutory presumption
unconstitutional as applied to the case at hand.272 Despite the court’s
determination that the statute itself was constitutional, the court’s
application of the Mathews test identified procedural issues that must be
considered in any case that uses presumptions.

3.

Minnesota’s Approach to the Statutory Presumption

Minnesota’s approach to statutory presumption challenges is
considerably different from Kansas’ approach and has been, in general,
less protective of parents’ rights until recently. Minnesota courts generally
have held where the presumption of unfitness applies, district courts need
not establish independent reasons for a subsequent termination of parental
rights.273 The court must base its decision to terminate parental rights on
the conditions at the time of the termination and “it must appear that the
conditions giving rise to the termination will continue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period.”274 Therefore, it is the parent’s burden to establish
that she or he is a fit parent.275
Furthermore, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has asserted, “[w]hen
the presumption of unfitness applies, a parent must affirmatively and
269. Id.
270. Id. at 675.
271. Id. at 676–77 (stating that a statute must be presumed constitutional and that the
court’s duty is to construe the statute in a manner that renders it constitutional).
272. Id. at 676.
273. In re J.W. and G.P., 807 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); In re
D.L.R.D., a.k.a. D.L.R.H., 656 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); but see In re
R.D.L. and J.W., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014) (stating that termination based solely
on a statutory presumption is improper and that courts must also find that the termination
is in the child’s best interests).
274. In re J.W. and G.P., 807 N.W.2d at 446 (quoting In re P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538,
543 (Minn. 2001)).
275. In re D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d at 250.
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actively demonstrate her or his ability to successfully parent a child.”276
This means that the parent has to do more than simply engage in services;
rather, the parent must “demonstrate that his or her parenting abilities
have improved.”277 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has acknowledged
that this is an “onerous task” and that it requires parents and their counsel
to “marshal any available community resources to develop a plan and
accomplish results that demonstrate the parent’s fitness.”278 The court of
appeals also has recognized that parents must accomplish this task in light
of the fact that the county is relieved of its burden to provide reasonable
efforts where the presumption applies.279
However, despite this
recognition, the court has not acknowledged, as the Kansas court did, that
allowing the presumption to operate in the child-welfare system puts
parents at a further disadvantage.280 That disadvantage results in the
“unacceptable risk” that a parent will erroneously be judged unfit.281

4.

Rebutting the Statutory Presumption in Minnesota

In 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified the parent’s burden
in rebutting the presumption and, in doing so, offered parents more
procedural protection by lowering the standard of proof required to rebut
the presumption. The court concluded, “the presumption is easily
rebuttable.”282 This is contrary to the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ prior
determinations that the parent must “affirmatively and actively
demonstrate her or his ability to successfully parent a child.”283 Yet, under
strict scrutiny analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned, “the
burden imposed by the presumption cannot be a heavy one.”284
In early 2018, in In re Child of J.A.K. and J.M.S., Parents,285
appellant-mother challenged the district court’s finding that she failed to
rebut the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness.286 The mother

276. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
277. In re J.W. and G.P., 807 N.W.2d at 446 (quoting In re Child of D.L.D., 771
N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)).
278. Id.
279. In re D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d at 251.
280. In re J.L. and D.L., 20 Kan. App. 2d 665, 672–73 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
281. Id.
282. In re Child of R.D.L. and J.W., Parents, 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014).
283. In re D.L.R.D., 656 N.W.2d at 251.
284. In re R.D.L. and J.W., 853 N.W.2d at 137; see also In re Child of J.A.K. and
J.M.S., Parents, 907 N.W.2d 241, 248 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
285. 907 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
286. Id. at 244–45.
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previously had her parental rights terminated after a three-day trial.287 After
the case was tried, but before the court issued its decision, the mother gave
birth to another child, K.J.K.288 The child was immediately placed in foster
care and the county petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights.289
After a two-day trial, the district court terminated the mother’s parental
rights to K.J.K., finding that she had failed to rebut the statutory
presumption of palpable unfitness.290 On appeal, the mother argued that
the district court erred when it terminated her parental rights on the basis
that she failed to rebut the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness.291
The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that contrary to the district
court’s finding that the mother failed to rebut the presumption, the record
demonstrated that the mother introduced “considerable evidence that is
inconsistent with the statutory presumption.”292 Among other things, the
court noted that the mother had seen a psychiatrist and was now taking
medication for her depression and personality disorder.293 She had been
sober for more than a year and had maintained consistent employment for
two years.294 She also was going to move into a two--bedroom apartment in
the near future.295 Further, the mother had completed a parenting
assessment, had regularly attended supervised visits with her child, and the
family therapist assigned to the case had noted that the mother was
attentive to the child’s needs and demonstrated that she was a “really
skilled mom.”296
Using the lower standard of proof established by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in R.D.L., the court of appeals concluded that the mother
had presented evidence that was sufficient to rebut the statutory
presumption.297 Accordingly, the court concluded that the presumption
“shall have no further role”298 in the case and that the burden shifted to the

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
2011)).

Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244–45.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 246–47.
Id. at 247.
Id. (quoting In re Child of J.W. and G.P., 807 N.W.2d 441, 447 (Minn. Ct. App.
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county to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother was, in
fact, unfit.299
Since 2015, Minnesota courts have begun to clarify and refine the law
regarding the statutory presumption. These cases illustrate not only the
importance of parental representation, but also the significance of
appellate review in this arena. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the
Minnesota Supreme Court hear more cases, parents may begin to enjoy
enhanced due process protections for their fundamental rights.
VII. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD?
The paramount concern in all child protection proceedings is the
“best interests of the child.”300 While the child’s interests and safety should
be the focus in these proceedings, courts cannot lose sight of the parents’
substantive and procedural rights. There are several issues that arise in
child protection proceedings that force a collision between a parent’s rights
and the child’s best interests. For instance, this issue arises in cases of
extrajudicial removal of the child from the parent’s care.301 Another more
recently explored example is where a parent wishes to call the child to
testify in permanency proceedings.
Under Minnesota law, parents are “entitled to be heard” and entitled
“to present evidence material to the case.”302 Often, the child at the center
of the proceedings has essential information that is highly relevant to the
court’s decision regarding permanency. Yet, requiring the child to testify
may not be in the child’s best interests, as testifying in open court might
not only be anxiety-provoking for a young child, but may also retraumatize the child. However, under subdivision 6 of section 260C.163 of
the Minnesota Statutes, the “court may, on its own motion or the motion
of any party, take the testimony of a child witness informally when it is in
the child’s best interests to do so.”303 Section 260C.163, however, does not
include language allowing a court to exclude the child’s testimony
altogether.304 Despite there being a method outlined in Minnesota law to
take the testimony of a child informally and no language allowing a court
to exclude a child’s testimony, there are two recent unpublished opinions
where the Minnesota Court of Appeals had to determine whether a district
299.
2018).
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

In re Child of J.A.K. and J.M.S., 907 N.W.2d 241, 247–48 (Minn. Ct. App.
MINN. STAT. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2.
See supra Part III.
MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 8.
Id. at subdiv. 6.

See id.
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court could exclude a child’s testimony entirely.305 These two cases shed
light on this important issue and also examined the conflict between the
child’s interests and the parent’s rights.

A.

In re Welfare of the Child of G.G., Parent

In In re G.G.,306 the appellant attempted to call her minor child to
testify on her behalf; however, the child’s attorney moved the court to
exclude the child’s testimony. The guardian ad litem, respondent father,
and the county agency joined that motion.307 Appellant argued that the
district court erred when it excluded the testimony of her minor child
because the court did not have discretion to do so under subdivisions 6–7
of section 260C.163.308 Subdivision 6 provides the district court with the
discretion to take testimony of a child informally when it is in the child’s
best interest to do so.309 Subdivision 7 allows the court to waive the
presence of the child at any stage of the proceeding when it is in the child’s
best interest to do so.310 Specifically, appellant argued that when reading
subdivisions 6 and 7 together, it is clear that “the legislature allows courts
to waive the presence of a minor in court, but that it cannot exclude the
testimony altogether. Thus, when it is not in the child’s best interest to
testify in open court, the legislature has provided another option: informal
testimony.”311
The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that it need not decide
whether subdivisions 6–7 of section 260C.163 allow a court to exclude a
child’s testimony because the court’s decision not to allow the child to
testify was not prejudicial error.312 Notably, the court asserted, “there is no
doubt that prohibiting a minor child from testifying may affect the
substantive rights of a parent and the child.”313 The court also expressed
“grave concern” with such exclusions in the future.314 So, while the court of
appeals expressed concern over future exclusions of a minor’s testimony,

305. See In re Child of Q.S.M. and T.R.S., A18-0662, 2018 WL 5915447, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018); In re Child of G.G., A18-0788, 2018 WL 5780446, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2018).
306. In re G.G., 2018 WL 5780446, at *1.
307. Id. at *2.
308. Id.
309. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 6.
310. Id. at subdiv. 7.
311. In re G.G., 2018 WL 5780446, at *2.
312. Id. at *6.
313. Id. at *6 n.1.
314. Id.
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this decision nonetheless seemed to allow a district court to exclude such
testimony in contravention of the clearly proscribed alternative method
outlined in subdivision 6 of section 260C.163. Such an exclusion
undoubtedly implicates a parent’s constitutional right to “fundamentally
fair procedures”315 since it denies the parent the right to present all relevant
evidence to the court. In an opinion issued one week later, a different
three--judge panel addressed the same issue.
B.

In re Welfare of the Child of Q.S.M., and T.R.S., Parents

In re Child of Q.S.M. and T.R.S explored the issue in greater
detail.316 Similar to In re G.G., the parent, in this case, attempted to call
her child to testify, but the district court, on the county’s motion, excluded
the child’s testimony without making any written or oral findings.317 Each
judge on the three-judge panel concluded that the district court erred in
precluding the minor’s testimony. Each judge, however, offered different
reasoning for this conclusion.318 Most relevant here are the concurrences
by Judge Ross and Judge Johnson.
In his concurrence, Judge Ross asserted that even if the statute in
question gave the district court the authority to exclude a child’s testimony,
“the district court may never apply that authority in a manner that fails to
give full account of a person’s fundamental, constitutionally protected right
to present relevant evidence in a case that threatens to terminate that
person’s parental rights to her children.”319 Accordingly, Judge Ross opined
that a parent has the right to present relevant evidence unless the court
finds that the risks to the child in testifying are greater than the interest in
maintaining the parent-child relationship.320
Similarly, Judge Johnson determined that the district court did not
have authority under chapter 260C to exclude the testimony of a child
who is the subject of the petition.321 Judge Johnson’s concurrence
expressed concern about interpreting the statutory best-interest policy
broadly, explaining that such an interpretation would “unjustifiably limit or
negate procedural rights” of parents.322 Moreover, he concluded that the
315. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).
316. In re Child of Q.S.M. and T.R.S., A18-0662, 2018 WL 5915447, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018).
317. Id. at *11.
318. See id.
319. Id. at CS-1 (Ross, J., concurring).
320. Id. at CS-2.
321. Id. at CS-1 (Johnson, J., concurring).
322. Id. at CS-3.
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court must interpret the statute in a manner that preserves its
constitutionality.323 As such, he advised the court to interpret the provisions
of section 260C.163 “in a manner that would avoid any infringement on a
parent’s constitutional rights.”324
Whether a parent has the right to call a minor child who is the
subject of the petition to testify is an unresolved question that implicates
both the constitutional rights of parents and the statutory rights of children.
This important issue demonstrates the tension between a parent’s rights to
“fundamentally fair procedures” and a child’s best interests, while also
illustrating a somewhat new acknowledgment by Minnesota courts that a
child’s best interests may, at times, have to yield to the parent’s
constitutionally protected rights.

C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s View of the Conflict Between
Parents’ Rights and the Child’s Best Interests

The issue of whether parents have the right to call a minor child to
testify on their behalf has not come before the Minnesota Supreme Court.
However, other issues that involve the conflict between a parent’s rights
and the best interests of the child have been addressed. A recent case
provides insight into the court’s current view of this tension and how it
should be resolved. Thus, this case may give attorneys who want to bring
such issues before the supreme court an indication of how the court may
rule on such issues.
In re Welfare of Child of R.K.325 involved a father’s appeal of an
order terminating his parental rights. The court of appeals dismissed the
father’s appeal of the order as untimely and the supreme court granted the
father’s petition for review to determine whether the appeal was, in fact,
untimely under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure.326
While the issue primarily revolved around interpreting provisions of the
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure regarding appellate
procedures,327 intimately intertwined with that issue was a conflict between
a parent’s due process rights and the child’s best interests.
The majority found that a “plain-language interpretation [of the rule]
[was] sufficient to resolve the case”328 and that permanency would not be
significantly delayed by allowing the father’s appeal to proceed since the
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id.
901 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. 2017).
Id. at 159.

Id.
Id. at 160.
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difference in the appeal period would be only three days.329 The majority
further asserted that expeditious resolutions to permanency are required,
so as to not allow children to “linger in uncertainty,” but “[t]he ‘just,
thorough, speedy, and efficient’ resolution of permanency also requires
that [the court] ‘ensure due process for all persons involved in the
proceedings.’”330 Specifically, the majority noted that permitting the father
to rely on mail service, rather than electronic service, to calculate his
appeal deadline “is consistent with the due process he is owed.”331
Accordingly, the court remanded to the court of appeals with instructions
to reinstate the father’s appeal.332 This decision came with a sharp dissent
by Chief Justice Gildea, joined by Justice McKeig.
Chief Justice Gildea addressed the interpretation of the rules
governing appeals and clarified that the interpretation must occur within
the context and through the lens of the larger issue: the best interests of
the child.333 She opened her dissent with a look at the goal of the
Children’s Justice Initiative, which directs the court “to look to the best
interests of the child at every step of [the] process.”334 She further asserted
that the majority undermined that goal of the Children’s Justice Initiative.
By relying on the “general principle that procedural rules are construed to
preserve the right to an appeal,” the majority disregarded the “overarching
objective” of juvenile protection matters, which is to make “an expedient
determination of permanency.”335 Accordingly, Chief Justice Gildea would
find, based “most importantly” on the best interests of the child, that the
father’s appeal was untimely.336
It comes as no surprise that this tension between the child’s best
interests and a parent’s rights produced a divided court. There are no easy
answers in situations where a child’s health, safety, and well-being are
pitted against a parent’s constitutionally protected rights. Despite the
paramount importance of serving “the best interests of the child,” courts
must be careful not to blindly pursue this objective and ignore the parent’s
due process rights in the process.337

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at 162.
Id. (quoting MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 1.02(f)).
Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982)).
Id. at 163.
See id. (Gildea, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2.
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VIII.CONCLUSION
Parents have both a substantive due process right to raise their
children and a procedural due process right to be afforded fundamentally
fair procedures when the state attempts to terminate the substantive right.
While elements of Minnesota law afford parents the procedural due
process to which they are entitled, other aspects are seriously lacking.
Several procedures under Minnesota law create barriers to fundamental
fairness for parents. They start when children are first removed from the
home and continue throughout the duration of the proceedings. Due to
the statutory presumption of unfitness, parents are confronted with these
procedural barriers even after a termination order has been entered.
Despite Minnesota’s strides in recent years, parents remain disadvantaged
in child protection proceedings.
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